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LEARNING DISABLED 
JUVENILES & MIRANDA RIGHTS 
- WHAT CONSTITUTES 
VOLUNTARY, KNOWING, & 
INTELLIGENT WAIVER 
Steven A. Greenburg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court in Colorado v. 
Connellyl held that under a due process analysis,2 police coer-
cion is a prerequisite to involuntary waiver of Miranda 3 rights.· 
• J.D. Golden Gate University School of Law, 1992; M.A.T. Beloit College, 1980; 
B.A. Beloit College, 1979. The author taught learning disabled children for 10 years and 
served as director of a private learning disabilities clinic for 7 years. I express my appre-
ciation to Sheila Reed, Professor Peter Keane, Professor Michael Zamperini, and Paula 
Ohliger for their editorial contributions toward this article. I also thank Information Ex-
press, Alice Kanter, and Angela Macfarlane for supplying supplemental research mate-
rial. A special thanks to Debi Greenburg for her continual support, both editorial and 
motivational. Finally, thank you Victor Greenburg. 
l. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l. 
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (In Connelly, the adult defendant was a chronic 
schizophrenic, who, while experiencing "command hallucinations," walked up to a police 
officer, waived his Miranda rights, and spontaneously confessed to a murder. He then 
confessed two more times after being given Miranda warnings. The Colorado Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court determination that due to defendant's mental disorder, his 
first spontaneous confession was involuntary despite the absence of police coercion be-
cause he lacked rational intellect and free will. The Colorado Supreme Court also agreed 
with the trial court that defendant's Mirandized confessions were also invalid because 
his waiver was not the result of free and intelligent choice, thus were involuntary. People 
v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 729 (Colo. 1985). On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed 
the Colorado judgment, holding that voluntariness under the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause requires only that a confession not be causally related to police coer-
cion. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. The Court stated that voluntariness inquiries into the 
487 
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This article explores whether Connelly is controlling under fed-
eral and California law where a juvenile waives Miranda rights, 
but lacks sufficient cognitive ability to understand those rights 
and the consequences of waiving them. 
The Connelly holding leaves unsettled three issues relating 
to Miranda waivers. First, it is unclear under Connelly whether 
a person must have sufficient cognitive abilities to voluntarily 
waive Miranda rights. Connelly explicitly holds that police coer-
cion must be causally connected to involuntary waiver under a 
due process analysis. 1I Yet the majority opinion includes in its 
voluntariness analysis the determination that the Connelly de-
fendant's mental illness did not significantly impair his cognitive 
abilities, thus he understood his rights when he waived them.s 
Connelly may therefore be factually distinguished from a case 
where the accused lacks sufficient cognitive abilities to under-
stand Miranda rights. Thus, juveniles whose cognitive abilities 
are impaired by learning disabilities may be outside the Con-
nelly decision. 
The second issue unresolved by Connelly is whether the vol-
untariness standard requiring coercion leaves intact the possibil-
ity that a Miranda waiver may be invalid if it is not knowing 
and intelligent.7 Subsequent decisions8 and commentary9 suggest 
defendant's state of mind separate from official coercion should be resolved by state evi-
dence rules relating to reliability; such matters are not governed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. [d. at 166-67). 
5. [d. 
6. [d. at 161-62. 
7. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (waiver must be "made voluntarily, knowingly, intelli-
gently."); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (inquiry into Miranda waiver has 
two distinct dimensions. 
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been volun-
tary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliber-
ate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. 
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness 
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the con-
sequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the 'totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both 
an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension 
may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have 
been waived. 
(citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979))). 
8. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 
573 (1987); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 & nA (1988); Michigan v. Harvey, 110 
S. Ct. 1176. 1179 (1990); Illinois v. Perkins. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990); Illinois v. Bernasco. 
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that the knowing and intelligent requirement remains intact 
subsequent to Connelly. It is also unclear whether the knowing 
and intelligent requirement, if it survives Connelly, is based on 
Fifth Amendment rights10 or is dependent solely on state rules 
of evidence. ll If the requirement is based on Fifth Amendment 
rights, states would be required to analyze the validity of Mi-
randa waivers in terms of whether the waiver was knowing and 
intelligent, and, if coercion was present, whether it was volun-
tary. One court, the Supreme Court of Illinois, has already taken 
this approach.12 
The third issue regarding post-Connelly Miranda waivers is 
whether the coercion standard applied to the adult Connelly de-
fendant applies with equal force to juvenile offenders. In the 
1967 In re Gault decision,13 the Supreme Court defined juvenile 
waiver standards under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
As a result of the Gault holding, COUtts apply heightened scru-
tiny when reviewing waivers and confessions by juveniles as 
compared to adults to ensure that such juvenile waivers and 
confessions are voluntary.14 
The specific factual issue addressed in this article is 
whether the federal waiver standards announced in Connelly re-
quire California courts, absent police coercion, to admit the con-
fession of a learning disabled juvenile who waives Miranda 
138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990). 
9. Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Admissibil-
ity, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PIIT. L. REV. 1007, 1042-54 
(1988); Note, Colorado v. Connelly: The Demise of Free Will as an Independent Basis 
for Finding a Confession Involuntary, 33 VILL. L. REV. 895, 920-22 (1988). 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V (in a criminal case, right against self-incrimination, and 
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law). 
11. Berger, supra note 9, at 1042-54 ("whether a suspect who establishes that he 
lacks awareness of his Miranda rights, despite receiving a full warning, can still execute a 
valid waiver consistent with the fifth amendment"); Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986) 
(Inquiries into the state of mind of the criminal defendant who has confessed, separate 
from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the state, should be resolved by 
state laws governing the admission of evidence. The U.S. Constitution creates no stan-
dard of its own in this area.). 
12. Illinois v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990). 
13. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
14. Id. at 55 ("We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver 
of the privilege by or on behalf of children." If counsel was not present, "the greatest 
care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not or.ly that 
it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of 
rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair."). 
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rights yet lacks sufficient cognitive ability to understand the 
rights and consequences of waiving them. Juveniles are unlikely 
to understand either the rights waived or the consequences of 
waiving them. II! Strong statistical evidence supports the conclu-
sion that a learning disabled juvenile may lack sufficient cogni-
tive abilities to voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive 
Miranda rights. I6 For example, learning disabled juveniles usu-
ally have deficient language and communication skillsP Conse-
quently, it is plausible that cognitive deficiencies resulting from 
these deficient language and communication skills would impair 
effective Miranda waivers. IS In addition, a disproportionate ratio 
of adjudicated juveniles have been diagnosed as learning dis-
abled. I9 This link between juvenile crime and learning disabili-
ties20 supports the conclusion that learning disabilities should be 
a significant factor in determining the validity of juvenile Mi-
randa waivers. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE "VOLUNTARINESS" STAN-
DARD FOR WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS UNDER FED-
ERAL LAW 
The United States Supreme Court, in Brown v. Missis-
sippi,21 held for the first time that a coerced confession violated 
the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.22 The Court applied the funda-
15. Id. See, e.g., infra note 18. 
16. See infra notes 17-19. 
17. See Gibbs & Cooper, Prevalence of Communication Disorders in Students with 
Learning Disabilities, 22 J. OF LEARNING DISABILITIES 60 (January 1989); Marge, PRINCI-
PALS OF CHILDHOOD LANGUAGE DISABILITIES 75-98 (1972); Newcomer & Magee, The Per-
formance of Learning (Reading) Disabled Children on a Test of Spoken Language, THE 
READING TEACHER 899-900 (1977). 
18. Even non-learning disabled juveniles are unlikely to knowingly and intelligently 
waive Miranda rights because they do not understand the nature and significance of 
their rights. See Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
39 (1970); Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analy-
sis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980). 
19. McKay & Brumback, Relationship Between Learning Disabilities and Juvenile 
Delinquency, 51 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 1223-26 (1980); Murray, The Link Be-
tween Learning Disabilities and Juvenile Delinquency: Current Theory and Knowledge, 
No. 244-819 U. S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE (1977). 
20. See infra note 19. 
21. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
22. Id. at 287. 
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mental rights23 of the Fourteenth Amendment and found that 
Brown's confession was coerced.24 Two years later, in Johnson u. 
Zerbst,u> the Court held that waiver of the right to counsel must 
reflect an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege."26 
In Rogers u. Richmond,27 the Court expanded on Brown, 
stating that due process requires that a confession must be vol-
untary28 as well as uncoerced.29 The Court continued to define 
voluntariness standards in Townsend u. Sain.30 The Townsend 
Court stated that a critical factor in determining the voluntari-
ness of a confession is whether the confession resulted from the 
accused's "free and rational choice."31 The Supreme Court in 
Haynes u. Washington 32 stated that the voluntariness of a con-
fession must be examined in the totality of the circumstances.33 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
was made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Malloy u. Hogan. 34 Subsequently, the Court in 
Miranda u. Arizona311 developed warnings36 to advise an accused 
of their Sixth Amendment37 right to counsel and Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination.38 The Miranda Court held 
23. Palco v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (C. J. Cardozo defined fundamental 
rights as those rights which are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Id. at 324). 
24.Id. 
25. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
26. Id. at 464. 
27. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
28. Id. at 540. See also Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). 
29. Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540 (1961). 
30. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
31. Id. at 307, 321 (In Townsend, police inadvertently gave the suspect a drug for 
his sickness which also had the effect of a truth serum. The police were unaware of the 
drug's effects and obtained a confession. The confession was held inadmissible because it 
was not the product of a free intellect.). See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 
(1941). 
32. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). 
33. Id. at 513. 
34. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
35. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
36. Id. at 467-76 (Warnings include the right to remain silent, an explanation that 
anything said can be used against the accused in court, the right to consult with counsel 
and to have counsel present during the interrogation, if the accused cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed to represent them, if the accused chooses to answer ques-
tions after the warning they may end the interrogation at any time.). 
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
38.Id. 
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that the prosecution has a heavy burden to show that waiver of 
rights contained in the Miranda warnings was made voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently.39 If the state fails to meet this bur-
den, the waiver is invalid.40 
The Supreme Court concluded that juveniles are entitled to 
the same rights to counsel and self-incrimination as adults in In 
re Gault.41 The Gault Court recognized the special vulnerability 
of juveniles during police interrogations.42 The Gault Court 
stated that although juveniles can waive their rights, such waiv-
ers must be closely examined for voluntariness.43 After the Gault 
decision, juvenile courts apply additional scrutiny in analyzing 
the voluntariness of juvenile waivers and confessions as com-
pared to the scrutiny applied to adults." 
In Brewer u. Williams4ll the Court held that for a waiver of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to be valid, in addition to 
understanding the right to counsel, an individual also must in-
tend to relinquish it.46 Although Brewer was decided on Sixth 
Amendment grounds regarding waiver of the right to counsel,47 
the same test arguably applies in determining the validity of a 
waiver of Fifth Amendment Miranda rights: whether the ac-
cused not only understood the right to remain silent, but also 
intended to relinquish that right.4s Under the Brewer analysis, a 
39. Id. at 457. 
40.Id. 
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
42. Id. at 14-18. 
43. [d. at 55. See also notes 9, 18. 
44. Id. at 55. 
45. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
46. [d. at 403 (The proper standard in determining the question of waiver as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law is that the State must prove "an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
at 464». 
47. Brewer, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
48. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 (1988). In Patterson, the Court 
stated: "In the past, this Court has held that a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is valid only when it reflects 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege.' " Id. (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 401, 404 (1977); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938» ("In other words, the accused must 'kno[w) 
what he is doing' so that 'his choice is made with his eyes open.' "). Id. (citing Adams v. 
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942» ("In a case arising under the Fifth Amendment, we 
described this requirement as 'a full awareness [of) both the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' "). Id. (citing Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986» ("We now fil'ld a strong similarity between the level of 
6
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juvenile's waiver of the right to remain silent would be invalid if 
it were shown that the juvenile's learning disability precluded 
understanding of the right waived. 
In Fare v. Michael C.49 the Court considered whether a ju-
venile had knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights. IIO 
The Court held that the totality of the circumstances deter-
mines whether a juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived Mi-
randa rights and therefore the waiver was valid. III Factors to be 
considered when inquiring into the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation include the juvenile's age, experi-
ence, education, background, intelligence and whether they have 
the capacity to understand the nature of the warnings given 
him, the nature of their Fifth Amendment rights, and the con-
sequences of waiving those rights. 52 Thus, the Fare court im-
pliedly supports the position that a learning disability, if a sig-
nificant factor in the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the interrogation, may preclude a valid juvenile waiver. 
In Moran v. Burbine,53 the Court found the adult defend-
ant's waiver of the right to counsel valid, holding that events 
occurring without the defendant's knowledge have "no bearing 
on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a con-
knowledge a defendant must have to waive his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and 
the protection accorded to Sixth Amendment rights."). [d. at 298, n.12. (citing Comment, 
Constitutional Law - Rights to Counsel, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 409 (1981)). 
49. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (In Fare, a sixteen and one-half year old 
juvenile was taken into custody on suspicion of murder. He was Mirandized before ques-
tioning. At the outset of questioning, the defendant asked to speak with his probation 
officer. Police denied his request and defendant agreed to talk with the officers without 
consulting an attorney. After implicating himself, he was charged in juvenile court with 
the murder. Defendant claimed his incriminating statements violated Miranda because 
his request to see his probation officer constituted an invocation of his Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent. The trial court admitted the statements, holding that defendant 
waived his right to remain silent notwithstanding his request to see his probation officer. 
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding defendant's request to see his probation 
officer was a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights in the same way as if he 
had requested an attorney. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that on 
the totality of the circumstances, defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth 
Amendment rights.). 
50. [d. at 724 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)) (In Butler, 
the Court inquired "whether the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the 
rights delineated in the Miranda case."). 
51. [d. at 725. 
52. [d. (emphasis added). 
53. Moran, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
7
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stitutional right."II. The Moran Court applied the Miranda 
waiver standard first articulated in Johnson v. Zerbst,1I1I that 
waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly; and intelligently.1I6 
The Moran court stated that the waiver inquiry "has two dis-
tinct dimensions. "117 First, the waiver must have been "voluntary 
in the sense that it was the product of free and deliberate choice 
rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Second, the 
waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the 
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the 
decision to abandon it."118 The "totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation"119 must reveal "both an un coerced 
choice and the requisite level of comprehension" for the waiver 
to have been effective.60 
Nine months following Moran, the Court in Colorado v. 
Connelly held that although the defendant was mentally ill, his 
waiver was voluntary, thus valid.61 The Connelly Court, seem-
ingly in contradiction to the dual waiver requirements62 an-
nounced in Moran, held that a waiver cannot be involuntary 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
absent police coercion.6s The majority reasoned that the sole 
concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, 
is governmental coercion.64 The Court stated that under a due 
process analysis, beginning with Brown v. Mississippi,611 all cases 
deciding the constitutionality of a confession have contained a 
substantial element of police coercion.66 The Connelly Court 
54. Id. at 422 (In Moran, police did not tell the defendant that a lawyer had been 
retained for him and was attempting to see him. Police tried to prevent the lawyer from 
seeing the accused. The Court stated that the facts in Moran did not amount to a due 
process violation. Yet the majority left open the possibility of a due process violation "on 
facts more egregious than those presented here." Id. at 432). 
55. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 475 (1938). 
56.Id. 
57. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 
(1981); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977». 
58. Id. at 421. 
59. Id. (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 
441 U.S. at 374-75 (1979». 
60. Id. (emphasis added). 
61. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 157 (1986). 
62. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986). See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
63. E.g., Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (1986). 
64. Id. at 170. 
65. Brown, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
66. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163, 164 (1986) ("Thus the cases considered by this court 
8
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stated that it is not the role of the Court· to make "sweeping 
inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has 
confessed" unless there is evidence of police coercion.67 The ma-
jority reasoned that because a psychiatrist testified that Con-
nelly's mental illness did not significantly impair his cognitive 
abilities, he understood his rights when he waived them.68 Thus, 
without evidence of coercive police conduct, his waiver was 
\·oluntary.69 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court, in Colorado v. 
Spring,1° continued to state that Miranda waivers must be made 
"voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."71 The Court followed 
the Moran approach in analyzing the effectiveness of the Mi-
randa waiver in terms of both its coerciveness and whether it 
was knowingly and intelligently made.72 Citing Connelly,73 the 
Court found that defendant's decision to waive his Miranda 
rights did not result from coercive police conduct and therefore 
was voluntary. The Court then concluded that defendant's 
waiver was knowingly and intelligently made.74 Citing Moran,75 
the Court stated that "the Constitution does not require that a 
criminal suspect know and understand every possible conse-
over the 50 years since Brou·n l·. Mississippi have focused upon the crucial element of 
police overreaching." [d. at 163) (The Connelly Court cites evidence of coercion in post-
Brolm U.S. Supreme Court due process waiver cases. [d. at n.l. The Court concludes: 
"While each confession case has turned on its own set of facts justifying the conclusion 
that police conduct was oppressive. all have contained a substantial element of coercive 
police conduct." [d. at 163-64). 
67. [d. at 166-67. 
68. [d. at 161. 
69. [d. at 167. 
70. Colorado v. Spring. 479 ES. 564 (1987). 
71. [d. at 572. 
72. [d. at 573-74 (In Spring. the defendant was implicated in a Colorado murder 
based on information received from an informant regarding the defendant's involvement 
in interstate transportation of stolen firearms. His arrest resulted from the undercover 
purchase of stolen firearms from the defendant. After being arrested. defendant wai\'ed 
his ,"Iiranda rights. While being questioned about the firearms transactions. police asked 
defendant whether he had shot the murder victim. which he denied. Police again ques-
tioned defendant almost two months later. Defendant again waived his Miranda rights. 
He then confessed to the Colorado murder. The United States Supreme Court held that 
a suspect's awareness of all the crimes about which he could be questioned during inter-
rogation did not invalidate his decision to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. Therefore. failure to inform defendant before the second interrogation 
that they would question him about the murder did not affect his waiver.). 
73. [d. at 574. 
7·1. [d. at 574-75. 
75. Moran. 475 U.S. 412 (1986!. 
9
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quence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege."76 
~ 
This limitation is also stated in Connelly,77 and represents 
the Court's legitimate reluctance to analyze the mental process 
of every defendant who waives Miranda rights and later decides 
to challenge the validity of the waiver in court. However, this 
limitation does not preclude courts from evaluating juvenile 
waivers in terms of whether they are knowing and intelligent. 
Courts need not make "sweeping inquiries into the state of 
mind"78 of juvenile offenders (or, for that matter, criminal de-
fendants) to ensure that juveniles have sufficient cognitive skills 
to knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights. 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court again applied 
the "dual waiver requirements" announced in Moran. The Court 
in Patterson v. Illinois79 determined the validity of defendant's 
Miranda waiver of the right to counsel in terms of whether the 
waiver was both voluntary, and knowing and intelligent.8o The 
court again recognized the dual requirements81 that a Miranda 
waiver must be knowing and intelligent82 as well as voluntary.83 
In summary, the United States Supreme Court decisions 
following Connelly suggest that the knowing and intelligent re-
quirement remains intact.84 Arguably, the requirement depends 
on Fifth Amendment grounds and is not, as stated by the Con-
nelly court, solely dependent on States' rules of evidence.81i The 
decisions subsequent to Connelly deciding a waiver issue reach 
76. Spring, 479 U.S. at 574 (1987). 
77. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986). 
78.Id. 
79. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988). 
80. Id. at 292 & n.4 (In Patterson, the Court held that Miranda warnings were suffi-
cient to make the defendant aware of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during 
post-indictment questioning. The Court concluded that defendant's un counseled state-
ments were admissible where he knowingly and intelligently chose to communicate with 
police without assistance of counsel.). 
81. See infra notes 56-59, 61 and accompanying text. 
82. Id. at 292 ("The specific issue here is whether this waiver was a 'knowing and 
intelligent' waiver of his Sixth Amendment right." Id. (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. at 401, 404 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464-65 (1938»). 
83. Id. at n.4 ("Of course we also require that any such waiver must be voluntary."). 
84. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 
285, 292 & n.4 (1988); Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1179 (1990); Illinois v. Per-
kins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990). 
85. See infra note 11. 
10
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their holdings with no mention of the applicable States' rules of 
evidence.86 Therefore, apparently in some circumstances, as 
where a learning disabled juvenile lacks sufficient cognitive skills 
to knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights, a Miranda 
waiver can be invalid even though police coercion is absent. 
III. WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS BY JUVENILES IN 
CALIFORNIA 
California courts have closely paralleled federal standards in 
determining the validity of a juvenile's waiver of Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights. In a pre-Miranda 'case, People v. Lara,87 the 
California Supreme Court held that juveniles are competent to 
waive constitutional rights88 and to make voluntary confes-
sions.89 Two California decisions, In re Anthony J.90 and In re 
Jessie L.,91 parallel the factors set forth in Fare v. Michael C. 92 
for courts to consider when determining the voluntariness of a 
juvenile confession. These factors include age, intelligence, edu-
cation, experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and 
effect of statements to police.93 As in Fare, these factors are con-
sidered in the totality of the circumstances.94 
Following the United States Supreme Court In re Gault de-
cision,95 California courts state that the prosecution has an even 
86. See note 82. 
87. People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967). 
88. Id. at 378-79, 432 P.2d at 211-12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96. 
89. Id. at 383, 432 P.2d at 215, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 599. 
90. In re Anthony J., 107 Cal. App. 3d 962, 166 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1980) (The court 
held that a 15 year old defendant with borderline I.Q. is not precluded from intelligently 
waiving Miranda rights.). 
91. In re Jessie L., 131 Cal. App. 3d 202, 182 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982) (In Jessie L., a 14 
year old was held to have voluntarily waived his Miranda rights where a diagnostic study 
showed he was in the 9th grade and had 5th to 7th grade skills, an 89 LQ., and average 
LQ. potential. The defendant claimed not to have understood the Miranda instruc-
tions.). See also In re Willie T., 71 Cal. App. 3d 345, 139 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977) (A juve-
nile with an 85 LQ. who is far behind in school is not incapable of intelligently waiving 
Miranda rights.). 
92. Fare, 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
93. Anthony J., 107 Cal. App. 3d 962, 166 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1980); Jessie L., 131 Cal. 
App. 3d 202, 182 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982). 
94. Anthony J., 107 Cal. App. 3d at 971, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (1980) ("The burden 
is on the prosecution to establish that an accused's statements are voluntary."); See, e.g., 
People v. Eduardo N.G., 108 Cal. App. 3d 745, 166 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1980). 
95. Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). 
11
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greater burden to prove the voluntariness of a juvenile waiver 
than with an adult waiver.98 California courts look closely at 
whether the juvenile accused understood the Miranda rights 
prior to waiving them.97 
The court in In re Brian W. 98 held the juvenile'S waiver was 
valid because the police explained his rights in a language he 
understood.99 The juvenile changed his mind and waived his 
rights after initially deciding not to do SO.100 In In re Frank 
C./Ol the court again closely scrutinized the juvenile's waiver to 
ensure it was voluntary. In Frank C., the waiver was held valid 
where the juvenile's actions and words did not suggest a lack of 
understanding of his rights or the effect of waiver of his rights. l02 
In In re John S./03 the court held that because the juvenile 
calmly told the police officer he understood his rights and 
wanted to waive them, the waiver was voluntary. 10. The court 
also held that there is no requirement that a juvenile must have 
parental consent for a waiver to be valid. 1011 
Analyzing the voluntariness of waivers by learning disabled 
juveniles is conceptually similar to analyzing waivers by men-
tally ill adults. l08 The voluntary waiver issue is often presented 
96. Anthony J., 107 Cal. App. 3d at 971, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (The burden to 
prove the accused's statements are voluntary is greater in the case of a juvenile than the 
case of an adult.). 
97. Id. See also infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
98. In re Brian W., 125 Cal. App. 3d 590, 178 Cal. Rptr. 159; cert. denied, 456 U.S. 
980 (1981). 
99.Id. 
100. Id. 
101. In re Frank C., 138 Cal. App. 3d 708, 188 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1982). 
102. Id. at 712-14, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 70-72. 
103. In re John S., 199 Cal. App. 3d 441, 245 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1988), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 928 (1988). 
104. Id. at 444, 446, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19. (The court also referred to the fact that 
the defendant did not claim he was unable to make an intelligent and knowing waiver 
due to any lack of maturity, intelligence, or education. Id. at 446, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 19). 
105. Id. at 446, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 19. 
106. A Miranda waiver by a mentally ill adult may be similar to a waiver by a learn-
ing disabled juvenile in that both waivers may be effectuated by an individual lacking 
sufficient cognitive skills to voluntarily waive those rights. Such waivers are involuntary 
if the individual is unable to understand their rights and the consequences of the deci-
sion to waive those rights. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 403; Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464; Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. at 292; Adams v. McCann, 317 U.S. 
at 279; Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421. See also infra notes 44-47 and accompanying 
paragraph. 
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in the context of an adult defendant who, as in Connelly, has 
some form of mental disorder. Sixteen years prior to Connelly, 
the California Supreme Court in People v. MacPherson lo7 held 
that a mental condition can render a confession invalid, even ab-
sent police coercion. lOS The MacPherson Court held that a state-
ment given to police by an adult schizophrenic defendant was 
involuntary and violated due process.109 The Court stated that 
"it is immaterial that the statements were not elicited by law 
enforcement officials and that defendant's capacity to refrain 
from making the statements was destroyed by mental disorders 
beyond anyone's control."110 The adult's confession violated due 
process due to the unreliability of the confession and lack of ra-
tional choice of the accused. III 
The MacPherson due process analysis left the door open for 
subsequent courts. to apply a similar analysis when deciding 
whether a waiver by a learning disabled juvenile violated due 
process. Under this analysis, California courts would be permit-
ted to hold that a juvenile waiver violated due process if a learn-
ing disability precluded voluntary waiver. But the United States 
Supreme Court holding in Connelly 1l2 forced California courts 
to review waivers under the Connelly, as opposed to the Mac-
Pherson, analysis. As a result, in California (at least where the 
facts parallel those in Connelly), as long as a mentally ill de-
fendant possesses sufficient cognitive skills to waive Miranda 
rights, the waiver and subsequent confession is valid, absent po-
lice coercion. 
California voters voiced their preference toward limiting 
107. People v. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109, 465 P.2d 17, 84 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970). 
108. [d. at 115, 465 P.2d at 21, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
109. [d. 
110. [d. 
111. [d. The court stated: 
Under these circumstances, it is immaterial that the state-
ments were not elicited by law enforcement officials and that 
defendant's capacity to refrain from making the statements 
was destroyed by mental disorders beyond anyone's con-
trol. .. This judgement can without difficulty be articulated in 
terms of the unreliability of the confession, the lack of rational 
choice of the accused, or simply the strong conviction that our 
system of law enforcement should not operate to take advan-
tage of a p,erson in this fashion. 
112. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986). 
13
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rights afforded criminal defendants under the California Consti-
tution by voting in favor of Proposition 8 in 1982 and Proposi-
tion 115 in 1990. This preference among California voters to 
limit rights afforded criminal defendants parallels the recent 
trend of the United States Supreme Court toward limiting de-
fendant rights. The Connelly decision is a clear example of the 
federal trend. 
Proposition 8,113 or the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provi-
sion, amended the California Constitution to state that, except 
as provided by statute, relevant evidence may not be excluded in 
any criminal or juvenile proceeding.1l4 The provision states, m 
pertinent part: 
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted 
by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each 
house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall 
not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, in-
cluding pretrial and post conviction motions and 
hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile 
for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile 
or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect 
any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to 
privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 
352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall af-
fect any existing statutory or constitutional right 
of the press. m 
The Truth in Evidence provision has been interpreted by the 
California Supreme Court in People u. Markham 1l6 as disposing 
of judicially created exclusionary rules, except as required by the 
Constitution of the United States. ll7 Therefore, under the Cali-
113. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) [hereinafter Truth in Evidence Provision). 
114. [d. 
115. [d. (emphasis added). 
116. People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d. 63, 69, 775 P.2d 1042, 1046, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 
277 (1989). 
117. [d. at 69, 775 P.2d at 1046, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 277. The Markham court stated: 
Given the probable aim of the voters in adopting section 
28(d), namely, to dispense with exclusionary rules derived 
solely from the state Constitution, it is not reasonably likely 
that the California voters intended to preserve, in the form of 
a 'statutory' privilege, a judicially created exclusionary rule ex-
pressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court under 
the federal Constitution. 
See also In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d. 873, 887, 694 P.2d 744. 752. 210 Cal. Rptr. 631. 639-
14
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fornia Constitution, waiver admissibility standards regarding the 
exclusion of evidence are prescribed by the federal 
Constitution. 118 
This trend among California voters toward limiting rights 
afforded criminal defendants to those required by the federal 
Constitution continued in June, 1990, when a majority of 
Californians voted in favor of Proposition 115,119 known as the 
"Crime Victims Justice Reform Act." Section 3 of Proposition 
115, which has been struck down by the California Supreme 
Court in Rauen u. Deukmejian,120 would have limited the rights 
of criminal adult and juvenile defendants to those afforded by 
the United States Constitution.121 The provision held unenforce-
able by the Rauen court, Section 3, would have amended Section 
24, Article I of the California Constitution to read, in pertinent 
part: 
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to 
equal protection of the laws, to due process of 
law, to the assistance of counsel, to be pe~sonally 
present with counsel, to speedy and public trial, 
to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront 
the witnesses against him or her, to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to 
not be compelled to be a witness against himself 
or herself, not to be placed twice in jeopardy for 
the same offense, and not to suffer the imposition 
of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be con-
strued by the courts of this state in a manner con-
sistent with the Constitution of the United 
States. This Constitution shall not be construed 
by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal 
defendants than those afforded by the Constitu-
40 (1985) (The Lance W. court stated: "The people have apparently decided that the 
exclusion of evidence is not an acceptable means of implementing those rights except as 
required by the Constitution of the United States."). 
118. See infra note 114. 
119. 1990 Cal. Adv. Legis. Servo 115 (West). 
120. Raven V. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990) (The Raven court stated that the 
effect of the measure would amount to a revision of the California Constitution, which is 
beyond the result of the initiative process. The court reasoned that Section 3 of Proposi-
tion 115 unduly restricts judicial power in a way which severely limits the independent 
force and effect of the California Constitution. Therefore, the court held that Section 3 
of Proposition 115 may not be enforced.). 
121. 1990 Cal. Adv. Legis. Servo 115 (West). 
15
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tion of the United States, nor shall it be con-
strued to afford greater rights to minors in juve-
nile proceedings on criminal causes than those 
afforded by the Constitution of the United 
States. "IU 
Accordingly, if voters had been successful in implementing Sec-
tion 3 of Proposition 115, federal constitutional standards re-
garding waiver of Miranda rights would have controlled case law 
in California. Specifically, California courts would have been re-
quired to apply the federal Connelly holding that mental illness 
does not in itself render a waiver involuntary.u3 The Connelly 
holding is contrary to the California MacPherson holding that a 
confession by a mentally ill person is involuntary and violates 
due process. l24 
Section 3 of Proposition 115, if implemented, would have 
presented another hurdle in addition to Proposition 8 for courts 
to . overcome in order to hold invalid waivers by mentally ill 
adults or learning disabled juveniles. Yet the Raven 12& court 
overturned Section 3 of the provision restricting state criminal 
rights to rights under federal law.126 As a result, Section 3 of 
Proposition 115 does not prevent California courts from follow-
ing state constitutional principles relied on in MacPherson 127 in 
order to invalidate a waiver and subsequent confession by a 
mentally ill person because it violates due process.128 
The MacPherson due process analysis arguably applies to 
waivers by learning disabled juveniles.129 Yet Proposition 8 pre-
vents implementing the MacPherson due process analysis 
through the exclusionary rule, unless the court concludes the 
statement is so inherently unreliable that it may be excluded as 
nonprobative under California Evidence Code section 352.130 AI-
122. [d. (emphasis added). 
123. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (Absent police coercion, waiver cannot be invol· 
untary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.). 
124. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109, 465 P.2d 17, 84 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970). 
125. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990). 
126. [d. 
127. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109,465 P.2d 17,84 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970). 
128. [d. 
129. See infra notes 103. 108 and accompanying text. 
130. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d); See also infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
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though Section 3 of Proposition 115 was invalidated, the court 
did not invalidate the remaining provisions of the proposition. 
The sections of Proposition 115 unaffected by the Raven deci-
sion are additional examples of the continuing preference among 
California voters to follow federal law in defining criminal rights 
under the state constitution. 
IV. LEARNING DISABILITIES, COGNITION, AND JUVE-
NILE CRIME - AN OVERVIEW 
A. LEARNING DISABILITIES AND COGNITION: DEFINED 
It is estimated that 10,000,000 American children have been 
diagnosed as suffering from learning disabilities. 131 A learning 
disability is an inability to effectively process oral, written, or 
visual information.132 Individuals who are learning disabled are 
usually average or above average in intelligence, but lack skills 
necessary for processing sensory information.133 The former U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare defined specific 
learning disabilities as disorders in the understanding, or 
processing of language, including difficulties in listening, think-
ing, communicating, reading; or math. I3• 
131. 131 CONGo REC. S10,800-01 (1985). 
132. Morgan, Learning Disabilities and Crime: Struggle to Snap the Link, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 31, 1988, § B, at I, col. 2. 
133. [d. See also Higbee, Dwinell & Kalivoda, Serving Learning Disabled Students 
Within & Outside the Classroom (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the 
American College Personnel Association, Washington, D.C. (March 1989» (available 
from Educational Resources Informational Center) (citing definition by the Association 
of Children and Adults with Learning Disabilities [hereinafter ACLD). The ACLD is a 
nonprofit organization of parents and professionals with state and local affiliates 
throughout the United States.). 
as: 
134. [d. (referring to Federal Register definition, defining specific learning disability 
a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes 
involved in understanding and using language, spoken or writ-
ten, which may manifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen, 
think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical calcula-
tions. The term includes such conditions as perceptual handi-
caps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and 
developmental aphasia. The term does not include children 
who have learning problems which are primarily the result of 
visual, learning or motor handicaps, or mental retardation, or 
of environmental, cultural or economic disadvantage.). 
See also B. OSMAN. LEARNING DISABILITIES - A FAMILY AFFAIR 5, 169 (1985). 
17
Greenburg: Juvenile Miranda Waiver
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
504 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:487 
A learning disability is defined as "a response pattern in 
learning situations which is inefficient and which interferes with 
the student's ability to understand, remember, apply or inte-
grate the material being taught. "1311 A specific learning disability 
is "a chronic condition of neurological origin which selectively 
interferes with the development, integration, and/or demonstra-
tion of verbal and/or non-verbal abilities."ls6 The term "specific 
learning disability" does not include children who have learning 
problems that result from visual or motor handicaps, or mental 
retardation.137 
Learning disabilities are often the manifestation of cognitive 
problems. Cognition is the act or process of knowing and in-
cludes both awareness and judgment.13B Cognitive problems 
stem from difficulty organizing or sequencing thoughts or distin-
guishing between concepts.13D 
B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE DISORDERS AND LEARNING 
DISABILITIES 
For a waiver to be voluntary under a due process analysis, a 
juvenile must have the cognitive ability both to understand the 
Miranda rights and communicate a valid waiver.14o A juvenile is 
135. L. GREENE. KIDS WHO HATE SCHOOL - A SURVIVAL HANDBOOK ON LEARNING DIS-
ABILITIES 41 (1983). 
136. Higbee, Dwinell, & Kalivoda, Serving Learning Disabled Students Within & 
Outside the Classroom (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Col-
lege Personnel Association, Washington, D.C. (March 1989)) (citing ACLD definition). 
The full text of the ACLD definition of a Specific Learning Disability is: 
137. Id. 
a chronic condition of neurological origin which selectively in-
terferes with the development, integration, and/or demonstra-
tion of verbal and/or non-verbal abilities. Specific Learning 
Disabilities exist as a distinct handicapping condition in the 
presence of average to superior intelligence, adequate sensory 
and motor systems, and adequate learning opportunities. The 
condition varies in its manifestations. and in degree of severity. 
Throughout life the condition can affect self-esteem, educa-
tion, vocation, socialization, and/or daily living activities. 
138. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 161 (1969). 
139. Higbee, Dwinell, & Kalivoda, Serving Learning Disabled Students Within & 
Outside the Classroom (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Col-
lege Personnel Association, Washington, D.C. (March 1989)). 
140. In Fare v. Michael C., the Court stated that a juvenile'S capacity to understand 
the nature of the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the 
consequences of waiving those rights, are factors in determining whether a juvenile has 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss3/2
1991] JUVENILE MIRANDA WAIVER 505 
per se unable to effectuate a valid waiver if, due to a learning 
disability, there is a lack of sufficient cognitive abilities to un-
derstand Miranda rights and communicate a valid waiver.14l 
Language disorders are the type of learning disability most 
likely to prevent a valid juvenile waiver. 
Two components of a language disorder are deficient decod-
ing142 and encoding143 skills. A juvenile with a language disorder 
that includes deficient decoding skills may be unable to under-
stand the Miranda instructions. A juvenile who has deficient en-
coding skills may be unable to communicate a voluntary Mi-
randa waiver. Accordingly, it is crucial to determine if a learning 
disabled juvenile has deficient decoding and encoding skills 
when arguing that a waiver or subsequent confession by a learn-
ing disabled juvenile violates due process. 
Statistical evidence supports the position that because most 
learning disabled juveniles have language deficits, they are inca-
pable of either understanding Miranda rights or effectually 
waiving those rights. A recent study found that of 242 children 
with learning disabilities, 90.5% of the children had language 
deficits. IH One or more communication disorders were detected 
in 96.2% of the children tested.m The study concluded that "for 
the population studied, a learning disability was practically sy-
nonymous with a diagnosis of a communication disorder."I46 
This high rate of communication deficits among children with 
learning disabilities has been noted previously.I47 Earlier studies 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 
(1979). It is unclear whether the Connelly holding governing adult waivers abrogates the 
juvenile waiver standards set forth in Fare. 
141. See infra notes 9, 16-19 and accompanying text. 
142. Decoding is the process of responding to the auditory or visual information. To 
decode means to perceptually process sensory information, such as spoken language or 
visual images. L. GREENE, KIDS WHO HATE SCHOOL A SURVIVAL HANDBOOK ON LEARNING 
DISABILITIES 50 (1983). 
143. Encoding is the process of writing or speaking by retrieving the written or spo-
ken information from memory and using those symbols to express oneself. [d. at 218. 
144. Gibbs & Cooper, Prevalence of Communication Disorders in Students with 
Learning Disabilities, 22 JOURNAL OF LEARNING DISABILITIES 60 (1989) (study was con-
ducted in a school district in Alabama of 242 learning disabled students between ages 8 
and 12.). 
145. Id. at 61. 
146. Id. at 62. 
147. [d. at 60 (referring to FEAGANS, CURRENT TOPICS IN LEARNING DISABILITIES 87-
118 (1983); Freeman & Perkins, The Prevalence of Middle Ear Disease Among Learning 
19
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have also confirmed the prevalence of language deficits among 
learning disabled adults and juveniles with communication dis-
orders (although in smaller percentages).148 
Research conducted in 1986149 supports the position im-
pliedly taken by the Connelly court: that a juvenile who has suf-
ficient cognitive abilities is capable of understanding Miranda 
rights and voluntarily waiving them. The research found that of 
the learning disabled and language-impaired (LD/LI) children 
tested, the children communicated as effectively as their corre-
sponding age-mates.l~O At least initially, this conclusion seems to 
contradict the hypothesis that LD/LI children are deficient en-
coders of new information.lIIl Yet the authors were not surprised 
by the result because the LD/LI children and age-mates tested 
possessed similar cognitive levels and years of worldly experi-
ence.l~2 Thus, because this research did not compare LD/LI stu-
dents with dissimilar cognitive abilities, the results do not un-
dermine the position stated (and supported by research) above -
deficient encoding skills may preclude a valid juvenile waiver. 
The premise that learning disabled juveniles may not possess 
sufficient cognitive abilities to voluntarily waive Miranda rights 
also remains viable. 
The threshold inquiry regarding a learning disabled juve-
nile's ability to communicate a valid waiver should begin with an 
assessment of cognitive abilities. By establishing that a juvenile 
lacks sufficient cognitive abilities, the proponent can assert all 
three arguments proposed in this article:m 
Impaired Children, 18 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 205·10 (1979); JOHNSON & MORASKY, LEARN· 
ING DISABILITIES (2d ed. 1980); KEOH & MAJOR· KINGSLEY, A SYSTEM OF MARKER VARI· 
ABLES FOR THE FIELD OF LEARNING DISABILITIES (1982); MERCER, STUDENTS WITH LEARNING 
DISABILITIES (2d ed. 1983); SCHOLL, DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY AND RESEARCH IN LEARNING 
DISABILITIES (1981); WIIG & SEMEL, INTERVENTION FOR THE LEARNING DISABLED (1980)). 
148. Gibbs & Cooper, Prevalence of Communication Disorders in Students with 
Learning Disabilities, 22 JOURNAL OF LEARNING DISABILITIES 60 (1989) (referring to 
MARGE, PRINCIPALS OF CHILDHOOD LANGUAGE DISABILITIES 75·98 (1972); Newcomer & 
Magee, The Performance of Learning (Reading) Disabled Children on a Test of Spoken 
Language, THE READING TEACHER 899·900 (1977)). 
149. Meline, Referential Communication Skills of Learning Disabled/Language 1m· 
paired Children, 7:2 ApPLIED PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 129·40 (1986). 
150. I d. at 136. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. However, it should be kept in mind that a waiver by a learning disabled juve· 
nile who does not have deficient cognitive abilities can still be challenged by asserting 
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1) The Connelly coercion standard does not control where a 
learning disabled juvenile lacks sufficient cognitive ability to vol-
untarily waive' Miranda rights. 
2) Learning disabled juveniles are especially unlikely to 
possess sufficient cognitive skills to knowingly and intelligently 
waive Miranda rights. 
3) The Connelly waiver standard applies to adults and does 
not control juvenile proceedings. 
After establishing the juvenile's cognitive abilities, the pro-
ponent should then determine whether specific language deficits 
exist in areas such as decoding and encoding skills. By following 
this 2-step process, the proponent establishes both the cognitive 
deficiency (the effect resulting from the underlying learning dis-
ability) and its underlying cause (the specific learning 
disability). 
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEARNING DISABILITIES AND JUVENILE 
CRIME 
A 1980 journal article refers to previous studies citing statis-
tical information linking juvenile crime with learning disabili-
ties. Hi4 One statistic cited is that up to 90 per cent of institution-
alized or adjudicated juvenile delinquents in 1977 had some 
form of a learning disability. Hili Most studies show six times 
more learning disabled delinquent boys than girls. lli6 
In the late 1970s, two studies investigated the relationship 
between learning disabilities and juvenile delinquency.lli7 One 
study was conducted by the Association for Children with 
Learning Disabilities (ACLD) and the other by the National 
argument #3 above: The Connelly holding does not control juvenile proceedings. 
154. McKay & Brumback, Relationship Between Learning Disabilities and Juve-
nile Delinquency, 51 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 1223-26 (1980). 
155. Id. at 1224 (referring to Murray, The Link Between Learning Disabilities and 
Juvenile Delinquency: Current Theory and Knowledge, No. 244-819 U. S. GOV'T PRINT-
ING OFFICE (1977)). 
156. Id. (referring to Mauser, Learning Disabilities and Delinquent Youth, 9 ACA-
DEMIC THERAPY QUARTERLY 389-402 (1974». 
157. Crawford, The Link Between Delinquency and Learning Disabilities, 24 THE 
JUDGES' JOURNAL 23 (1985). 
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Center for State Courts. The research revealed the following sta-
tistical evidence linking learning disabilities and juvenile 
delinquency: 1118 
1) The chances of being adjudicated were 200 percent 
greater for juveniles with learning disabilities than for their non-
learning disabled peers. 
2) The odds of being taken into custody by police were also 
200 percent greater for learning disabled juveniles than for non-
learning disabled juveniles. 
3) 36 percent of adjudicated juveniles were learning 
disabled. 
4) For comparable offenses, learning disabled juveniles had 
higher probabilities of arrest and adjudication than those with-
out learning disabilities. 
The above statistical correlation between learning disabili-
ties and juvenile crime is also referred to in a recent article by 
Judge Thom'as P. McGee.11l9 Judge McGee cites additional stud-
ies of youths adjudicated by juvenile courts. Of the 40 to 70 per-
cent of juveniles studied who show significant neurodevelop-
mental abnormalities, language and cognitive abnormalities were 
common.160 Judge McGee refers to one hypothesis in the "Link 
Study"161 that might account for the high proportion of learning 
disabilities in the adjudicated juvenile population: differential 
adjudication caused by poor cognitive and communications 
skills.162 Judge McGee states that the learning disabled child 
may be unable to express himself in court as clearly as the non-
learning disabled child.163 Specific impairments resulting from a 
158. [d. 
159. Hon. T. McGee, Learning Disabilities and the Juvenile Justice System, LID 
LAW 5-7 (Spring, 1979) (Appellate Division, First Department, Supreme Court of New 
York; Committee on Juvenile Justice, Dyslexia, and Other Learning Disabilities) (Judge 
McGee is Chief Judge at Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court in Gretna, Louisiana. He is 
chairman of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges Committee on 
Learning Disabilities and Juvenile Delinquency. Judge McGee is a frequent speaker on 
the issue of learning disabilities and juvenile justice.). 
160. [d. 
161. [d. (referring to the ACLD study as the "Link Study."). 
162. [d. 
163. [d. 
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learning disability may make a juvenile "more susceptible to get-
ting into trouble with the law. . and less able to extricate him-
self from the process. "164 
The same argument set forth by Judge McGee to explain 
the link between learning disabilities and adjudications can be 
applied where learning disabled juveniles are arrested - that ar-
rested learning disabled juveniles are less able to express them-
selves and are "less able to extricate [themselves] from the pro-
cess. "1611 A recent journal article discusses hypothetical 
explanations for the connection between learning disabilities 
and delinquency.166 The "differential arrest hypothesis" main-
tains that learning disabled juveniles have a greater risk of being 
picked up by the police than do non-learning disabled 
juveniles.167 The "differential adjudication hypothesis" posits 
that once a learning disabled juvenile is charged with an offense, 
the juvenile is at greater risk of adjudication than with non-
learning disabled juveniles.16s 
Congress has recognized the link between learning disabili-
ties and juvenile crime and cites Judge McGee's conclusions re-
garding the reasons for this connection.169 The Senate, in its 
findings, refers to the statistical correlation between learning 
disabilities and criminal behavior: Although only 15 percent of 
the United States population is learning disabled, 36 percent of 
juvenile delinquency cases involve individuals with learning dis-
abilities. 170 Within the typical jail population, at least 40 percent 
of the inmates are learning disabled.17l In addition, the Senate 
acknowledges a Fordham University study that found that 
164. Id. at 6. 
165. Id. 
166. Eller, The Learning Disabled Delinquent, 11 THE LEARNING CONSULTANT JOUR-
NAL 34-36 (1990). 
167. Id. at 35. 
168. Id. 
169. 135 CONGo REC. 8601-01 (1989); 131 CONGo REC. 810,800-01 (1985); Proposed 
Amendment to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 to Au-
thorize Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1985 - 1989: Hearings on H.R. 4971 Before the 
Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d 
8ess. 513 (1984) ("There is definitely evidence that LD youth engage in significantly 
more delinquent behavior than non-LD youth."). See infra notes 156-63 and accompany-
ing text. 
170. 135 CONGo REC. 8601-01 (1989). 
171. Id. 
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learning disabled individuals are 220 percent more likely to be 
adjudicated than those who are not learning disabled.1'72 
Congress has authorized the development and implementa-
tion of programs relating to juvenile delinquency and learning 
disabilities.1'73 Specifically, Congress has funded training pro-
grams to assist juvenile justice personnel in recognizing learning 
disabled juveniles.1'74 Yet the connection between learning disa-
bilities and juvenile crime remains largely unaddressed by the 
juvenile court system.17II 
The analysis below is intended to help harmonize the Con-
nelly decision with juvenile waivers that are neither knowing or 
intelligent. Research cited below demonstrates that learning dis-
abled juveniles are especially unlikely to effect a knowing and 
intelligent waiver. At least one state supreme court has harmo-
nized the Connelly voluntariness analysis with the knowing and 
intelligent requirement, holding that the knowing and intelligent 
requirement is separate from the voluntariness standard pre-
scribed in Connelly.U6 That court found the juvenile waiver in-
valid because it was not knowing and intelligent.177 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. THE Connelly COERCION STANDARD DOES NOT CONTROL 
WHERE A JUVENILE LACKS SUFFICIENT COGNITIVE ABILITY TO VOL-
UNTARILY WAIVE Miranda RIGHTS 
In Connelly, the Court decided the validity of a Miranda 
waiver by an adult defendant. The Court determined that the 
defendant possessed sufficient cognitive abilities to understand 
his rights when he waived them.178 In contrast, a learning dis-
abled juvenile may lack sufficient cognitive abilities to under-
stand the Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them. 
172. 133 CONGo REC. S7,666-02 (1987). 
173. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5665(b)(5) (West 1990). 
174. [d.; H.R. 1801, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONGo REC. S16,156-01 (1988). 
175. 135 CONGo REC. S601-01 (1989). But see People V. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 
N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2052 (1991). 
176. [d. See infra notes 252-54, 258-60 and accompanying text. 
177. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2052 
(1991). 
178. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 161-62 (1986). 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss3/2
1991] JUVENILE MIRANDA WAIVER 511 
If the juvenile lacks sufficient cognitive skills, the waiver and 
subsequent confession is not voluntary. Therefore, the coercion 
waiver standard set forth in Connelly should not control. 
The Connelly majority begins its analysis by referring to the 
preliminary hearing testimony of Dr. Metzner, the psychiatrist 
who ~xamined Connelly. Dr. Metzner testified that Connelly was 
a chronic schizophrenic and was experiencing "command hallu-
cinations."179 The Court stated: "Dr. Metzner further testified 
that Connelly's illness did not significantly impair his cognitive 
abilities. Thus, respondent understood the rights he had when 
Officer Anderson and Detective Antuna advised him that he 
need not speak."ISO Therefore, reasoned the Court, Connelly un-
derstood the Miranda rights when he confessed.l81 
It is difficult to understand why the majority would cite evi-
dence that Connelly had sufficient cognitive abilities to under-
stand his rights and the consequences of waiving them unless it 
considered Connelly's cognitive abilities relevant to the analy-
sis. ls2 Neither Justice Brennan in his dissent nor the majority 
opinion considered the factual situation where a defendant did 
not in fact possess the cognitive abilities to enable a defendant 
to voluntarily waive their rights. 
The Connelly majority distinguishes between the ability to 
understand Miranda rights and waiver of those rights, and what 
motivates a person to confess. ls3 , This distinction is manifested 
by the Court's understandable reluctance to retrospectively eval-
uate a defendant's motivation in waiving Miranda rights or to 
subsequently confess. The Court was wary of expanding the 
"voluntariness" standard by requiring courts to "divine a de-
fendant's motivation for speaking or acting as he did,"184 or 
making "sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal 
defendant who has confessed"18C1 unless the police employed co-
ercion. However, the majority's reluctance to expand the volun-
179. [d. at 161 (referring to transcripts from preliminary hearing at 56). 
180. [d. at 161·62 (emphasis added) (referring to transcripts from preliminary hear-
ing at 56-57). 
181. [d. at 161-62. 
182. [d. 
183. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986). 
184. [d. 
185. [d. 
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tariness standard does not address a factual scenario where a 
juvenile, unlike the Connelly defendant, lacks the ability to un-
derstand the Miranda rights or the consequences of waiving 
those rights. Inquiring into a juvenile's cognitive abilities in or-
der to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to under-
stand their rights and the consequences of waiving them would 
not require a court to make the type of sweeping inquiries into 
what motivated the juvenile to confess that the Court was reluc-
tant to make. 
In his dissent in Connelly,188 Justice Brennan refers to the 
holding in Moran u. Burbine,187 stating that "the waiver must 
have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the 
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it."188 Justice Brennan argues that under the "totality 
of the circumstances" approach, a waiver is valid only if the 
choice to waive Miranda rights is uncoerced and there is a req-
uisite level of comprehension.189 Justice Brennan's analysis ad-
heres to the Moran dual requirements of both: 1) a knowing and 
intelligent, and 2) a voluntary waiver. 
Although the majority and Justice Brennan differ on the 
correct approach to determine whether a waiver is valid, both 
sides could agree that a waiver is invalid where a juvenile is per 
se unable to understand Miranda instructions due to a learning 
disability. In such a case, neither the position taken by the ma-
jority nor by Justice Brennan would be mutually exclusive. 
B. Connelly DOES NOT ABROGATE THE REQUIREMENT THAT A 
WAIVER MUST BE KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT IN ADDITION TO BE-
ING UN COERCED 
Beginning with the Miranda decision, the United States Su-
preme Court has stated that waivers of Fifth Amendment rights 
must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. leo The 
Fare Court stated that Miranda waivers are reviewed in the to-
186. [d. at 174-88. 
187. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986) (decided the same year as Connelly). 
188. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 188 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Moran, 475 
U.S. at 421 (1986». 
189. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 188 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
190. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (1967). 
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tality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.191 The 
Moran Court stated that there are dual requirements for Mi-
randa waivers: First, the waiver must be voluntary, in the sense 
that it is not the product of coercion.192 Second, the waiver must 
be knowing and intelligent, made with full awareness of both the 
nature of the right abandoned and a requisite level of compre-
hension. 193 Yet the Connelly holding seems to contradict the 
dual waiver requirements stated in Moran, holding that a waiver 
cannot be involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment absent police coercion.19• 
Although research shows that even non-learning disabled 
juveniles are unlikely to knowingly and intelligently waive Mi-
randa rights,1911 California courts follow the Connelly approach 
in analyzing adult waivers only in terms of their voluntariness.196 
California cases concerning juveniles have not commented spe-
cifically on the Connelly approach at the appellate or supreme 
court level. 197 One state supreme court subsequent to Connelly, 
the Supreme Court of Illinois, has held a waiver invalid where 
the juvenile's waiver was voluntary under the Connelly analysis, 
but not knowing and intelligent under Moran. 19S 
Research on the effectiveness of juvenile waiver indicates 
that most juveniles lack the capacity to voluntarily and intelli-
191. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 (1979). 
192. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986). 
193. Id. 
194. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (1986). 
195. See infra note 18. 
196. E.g., People v. Green, 189 Cal. App. 3d 685, 234 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1987); People v. 
Sultana, 204 Cal. App. 3d 511, 251 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1988); People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 
63, 775 P.2d 1042, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1989); People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d 
127, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990); People v. Cox, 221 Cal. App. 3d 980, 270 Cal. Rptr. 730 
(1990); People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 800 P.2d 516, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1990). 
197. At time of publication, the only post-Connelly appellate or Supreme Court de-
cision hearing an appeal from a juvenile trial court on a Miranda waiver issue is In re 
John S., 199 Cal. App. 3d 441, 245 Cal. Rptr. 17, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 316 (1988). The 
John S. court held that failure of the authorities to seek the consent of an adult in 
addition to the juvenile's waiver did not invalidate the subsequent confession. Id. at 445, 
245 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The court noted there was no claim that, based on his level of 
maturity, intelligence, or education, the juvenile was unable to make an intelligent and 
knowing waiver. Id. at 446. The John S. court concluded that his confession was "freely 
and voluntarily made after a knowing and intelligent waiver." Id. at 447, 245 Cal. Rptr. 
at 20. The court never reached the Connelly voluntariness issue. 
198. People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 2052 (1991). 
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gently waive Miranda rights. 199 In 1970, a study was con-
ducted200 wherein juveniles were interviewed using both the 
standard formal Miranda warnings and modified, simplified 
warnings.201 The interviews were analyzed to compare the 
juveniles' understanding of the formal warning compared with 
the simplified warnings. The researchers concluded that 94 per-
cent of the juveniles who received either the formal or simplified 
warnings did not intelligently relinquish a known right.202 
An analysis of two empirical studies on juveniles' capacity 
to waive Miranda rights was the subject of a 1980 law review 
article.203 The author concluded that waiver of Miranda rights 
by younger juveniles is not made intelligently, knowingly, and 
voluntarily because the juveniles tested do not understand the 
nature and significance of their rights.204 Juveniles below the age 
of fifteen answered research questions with the apparent belief 
they were compelled to confess without an attorney present.20~ 
The researchers concluded that the vast majority of these 
juveniles are far less likely than adults to comprehend the na-
199. See infra notes 17-18. 
200. Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39 
(1970). In this study, 90 juveniles were interviewed using formal Miranda warnings and 
simplified warnings. The simplified warnings were: 
Id. at 40. 
201. Id. 
You don't have to talk with me at all, now, or later on, it is up 
to you. 
If you decide to talk to me, I can go to court and repeat what 
you say, against you. 
If you want a lawyer, an attorney, to help you decide what to 
do, you can have one free before and during questioning by me 
now or by anyone else later on. 
Do you want me to explain or repeat anything about what I 
have just told you? 
Remembering what I've just told you, do you want to talk to 
me? 
202: Id. at 53. But see Now My Son, You Are a Man: The Judicial Response to 
Uncounseled Waivers of Miranda Rights by Juveniles in Pennsylvania, 92 DICK. L. REV. 
153, 175 n.138 (1987). -
203. Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980) [hereinafter Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda 
Rights]. 
204. Id. at 1166. 
205. Grisso & Promicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Proce-
dures, Safeguards. and Rights Waiver, 1 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 321 (1977). See also The 
Judicial Response to Uncounseled Waivers of Miranda Rights by Juveniles in Pennsyl-
vania, 92 DICK. L. REV. at 176 (1987). 
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ture and significance of the Miranda rights.206 
The research in Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda 
Rights207 shows that non-learning disabled juveniles are unlikely 
to effectively waive Miranda rights. Learning disabled juveniles 
typically have communication disorders that are likely to affect 
a juvenile's cognitive abilities.208 After considering this research, 
it appears that a learning disabled juvenile would be even more 
unlikely to knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights. 
As stated above, California courts have followed the Con-
nelly approach when analyzing adult waivers by ending the 
waiver analysis if there is no evidence of coercion.209 The courts 
above the trial court level which discuss Miranda waivers in 
terms of the Connelly holding involve adult, rather than juvenile 
defendants.21o One appellate court decision, In re John 8.,211 in-
volves a juvenile. Yet because there was no claim the juvenile 
was unable to make an intelligent and knowing waiver, the John 
8. court reached its holding without discussing Connelly.212 Nev-
ertheless, the adult waiver cases discussed below are instructive 
as the kind of analysis post-Connelly juvenile courts may utilize 
when reviewing waivers by learning disabled juveniles. 
In 1987, two months after Connelly, the court in People v. 
Green213 held that defendant's waiver was uncoerced and there-
fore voluntary.214 The court referred to Connelly in stating "Mi-
randa protects defendants against governmental coercion lead-
ing them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; 
it goes no further than that."2111 The court continued: "We sim-
206. Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights, 68 CALIF. L. REV. at 1160. 
207. See infra note 202. 
208. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
209. See infra note 195. 
210. Id. 
211. In re John S., 199 Cal. App. 3d 441, 245 Cal. Rptr. 17, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 
316 (1988). 
212. Id. at 446, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20. 
213. People v. Green, 189 Cal. App. 3d 685, 234 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1987). 
214. Id. at 691, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 499, 500. (In Green, defendant appealed his man-
slaughter conviction claiming his waiver was invalid because he honestly, Yet mistakenly 
believed that he could go home after being interrogated. The court stated that defend-
ant's mistaken belief he would be allowed to go home after the interrogation "does not 
render his waiver of his right to counsel invalid in the absence of any evidence demon-
strating that he was induced by the police to harbor this belief."). 
215. [d. at 693, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 500 (citing Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 524 (1986)). 
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ply cannot conclude that there is evidence of governmental coer-
cion in this case."216 Although claiming to follow Connelly, the 
court stated California waiver standards in terms that included 
the knowing and intelligent requirement as well as being 
voluntary.217 
In upholding a manslaughter conviction, the California Su-
preme Court in People v. Sultana218 also cited the Connelly co-
ercion prerequisite for a waiver or confession to violate the Fifth 
Amendment.219 The Court stated that under Connelly, "a con-
fession cannot be 'involuntary' within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless there is co-
ercive police activity."22o The court, in following Connelly, noted 
that under the California Constitution coerCive police activity is 
not a prerequisite for a confession to be involuntary.221 
In 1989, the California Supreme Court in People v. Mark-
ham222 held that under Proposition 8,223 the state must follow 
the federal constitution in proving the voluntariness of defend-
ant's confession only by a preponderance of the evidence, and 
not beyond a reasonable doubt.224 Although the Markham court 
affirmed the lower court's determination that defendant's waiver 
was knowing and intelligent,2211 the court only analyzes the 
216. [d. at 693, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 500. 
217. [d. at 691, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 499. (The Green Court stated: "In California, 
before a confession can be used against a defendant, the prosecution has the burden of 
proving that it was voluntary and not the result of any form of compulsion or promise or 
reward ... The totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine whether the 
confession was the product of a rational intellect and free will." [d. (emphasis added)). 
218. People v. Sultana, 204 Cal. App. 3d 511, 251 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1988) cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 1323 (1989). 
219. [d. (" 'The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, 
is governmental coercion,''' citing Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523 (1986)). 
220. [d. at 522, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 120. 
221. [d. at n.5. See, e.g., People v. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109, 465 P.2d 17, 84 Cal. 
Rptr. 129 (1970). See also infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
222. People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 775 P.2d 1042, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1989). 
223. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) [hereinafter Truth in Evidence provision). See infra 
notes 111-16 and accompanying text. 
224. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 65 n.2, 775 P.2d at 1043 n.2, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 274 n.2 
(1989) (The Markham court stated that the federal preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard "applies both to a determination of voluntariness in the "traditional sense" (i.e., 
whether a confession was "coerced" by improper acts or overreaching on the part of the 
police) - and to a determination of whether a defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was 
voluntary." (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168-69 (1986))).' 
225. [d. at 66, 70, 775 P.2d at 1044, 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 275, 279. 
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waiver in terms of its voluntariness.226 The court upheld the de-
termination by the trial court and magistrate that the defend-
ant's waiver had been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.227 
Markham focuses on the relationship between state and 
federal standards of review for voluntariness. The Court's dis-
cussion of voluntariness reflects the confusion surrounding the 
term "voluntary" as used in Connelly.228 The decision also re-
flects the trend toward applying federal constitutional standards 
governing rights afforded criminal defendants to those rights af-
forded under the California Constitution.229 In summarizing pre-
vious decisions in which the court applied Proposition 8, the 
court restated the intention of California voters for Proposition 
8 to abrogate "judicial decisions which had required the exclu-
sion of relevant evidence solely to deter police misconduct in vi-
olation of a suspect's constitutional rights under the state con-
stitution, while preserving legislatively created rules of 
privilege."23o The court, in citing In re Lance W., concluded that 
California voters believe, as shown by Proposition 8, that "the 
exclusion of evidence is not an acceptable means of implement-
ing those rights, except as required by the Constitution of the 
United States."231 The Markham court's analysis of the exclu-
sion of evidence under Proposition 8 shows how difficult it 
would be for California courts to vary from the federal waiver 
standard contained in Connelly. 
Justice Mosk, in his concurring OpInIOn in Markham, re-
vealed judicial dissatisfaction with the voter trend toward limit-
226. Id. at 70, 775 P.2d at 1046, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 278. See also infra note 223. 
227. Id. at 66, 70, 775 P.2d at 1044, 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 275, 278. 
228. See infra note 223. 
229. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text. 
230. Id. (citing People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369 
(1988» (In May, the Court held that the rule announced in People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 
101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), which held that a statement obtained in 
violation of a suspect's privilege against self incrimination cannot be used for impeach-
ment under state law, did not fall under the exception in Proposition 8 for existing statu-
tory rules of evidence relating to privilege. At issue was California Evidence Code section 
940, which states: "To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the 
United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any 
matter that may incriminate him." CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (West 1991». 
231. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 69, 775 P.2d at 1042, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 277 (citing In re 
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 887, 694 P.2d 744, 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 639-40 (1985». 
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ing individual rights in California.2S2 Justice Mosk cited federal 
authority allowing states to expand individual rights beyond 
those conferred in the Federal Constitution.233 Justice Mosk 
stated: "The blame for the sorry situation in which we find our-
selves must be placed squarely on Proposition 8. That ill-con-
ceived measure has struck down California precedents on indi-
vidual rights as it has encountered them in its path of 
destruction."234 As shown by Justice Mosk's concurrence, at 
least one member of the California Supreme Court is reluctant 
to restrict state rights to those afforded by the Federal 
Constitution. 
In People v. Clark,23/!' the California Supreme Court noted 
the trial court's determination that the defendant was mentally 
competent to make a voluntary and intelligent waiver of coun-
sel.2S6 While the court stated it was unnecessary to decide the 
waiver issue to resolve the case, the court noted that under Con-
nelly, there must be evidence of police coercion for there to be a 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.237 Although the court follows 
Connelly in requiring coercion for a Fifth Amendment viola-
tion,238 the Clark defendant, as in Connelly, did not lack the 
cognitive abilities to effectively waive his rights.239 This leaves 
open the possibility that, as discussed above, Connelly does not 
control where an individual lacks sufficient cognitive abilities to 
effectively waive Miranda rights. 
232. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 71, 775 P.2d at 1048, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (Mosk, J., 
concurring) . 
233. [d. (citing Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980), which 
states that federal court decisions do not "limit the authority of the State to exercise its 
police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties 
more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."). 
234. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 71, 775 P.2d 1042, 1048, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 280 
(1989). 
235. People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d 127, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990). 
236. [d. at 614, 789 P.2d at 147, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 419. 
237. [d. at 620 n.30, 789 P.2d at 152 n.30, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 424 n.30 (The Clark 
court stated: "Defendant seeks to rely on his right against self-incrimination as an inde-
pendent basis for exclusion of his statements. Since there was no state involvement or 
compulsion in eliciting his statements, no violation of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion occurred." (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164 (1986»). 
238. [d. 
239. [d. at 614,789 P.2d at 147, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 419 ("The [lowerl court noted that 
defendant was mentally competent to represent himself and to make a voluntary and 
intelligent waiver of counsel.") (emphasis added). . 
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The appellate court in People v. COX240 rejected a claim that 
a statement should be excluded because defendant's mental con-
dition precluded knowledgeable and voluntary waiver. The court 
rejected this argument because it was impermissibly based on 
Fifth Amendment grounds.241 The court interpreted Connelly as 
explicitly rejecting the proposition that a mental condition can 
preclude knowledgeable and voluntary waiver of Fifth Amend-
ment rights.242 The Cox court concluded that under the progeny 
of cases interpreting Proposition 8, it is "obliged to follow fed-
eral precedent in determining admissibility of confessions or ad-
mission dependant upon the factor of voluntariness.24s We 
therefore follow Colorado v. Connelly and affirm the trial court's 
ruling of admissibility."2H Yet Cox acknowledges that California 
may still exclude evidence under Proposition 8, even though 
under Connelly the admission is not coerced.ulI Therefore, a 
confession may be excluded if, for example, it is inherently unre-
liable or unfairly prejudicial under California evidentiary law. 
Confessions by learning disabled juveniles could thus be ex-
cluded in this manner. 
The California Supreme Court held that a learning disabled 
defendant's Miranda waiver was voluntary in People v. Kelly.u6 
240. People Vo Cox, 221 Cal. App. 3d 980, 270 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1990). 
241. Ido at 986, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 733. 
242. Ido 
243. Ido at 986-87, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 734 (referring to People v. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 
3d 109, 115, 465 P.2d 17, 21, 84 Cal. Rptro 129, 133 (1970); People v. Sultana, 204 Cal. 
App. 3d 511, 522 n05, 251 Cal. Rptr. 115, 121 n.5 (1988); People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 
63, 67 n.3, 68, 775 P.2d 1042, 1044 n.3, 1045, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 275 n.3, 276 (1989); In re 
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 888-89, 694 P.2d 744, 753-54, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 641 (1985». 
244. Cox, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 987, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 734 (1990). 
245. Ido at 986 n.3, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 733 n.3 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67) 
(The Cox court cited Connelly which states, in discussing inquiries into the state of mind 
of a criminal defendant who has confessed, 
"We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry 
to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evi-
dence and erects no standard of its own in this area. A state-
ment rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be 
proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be gov-
erned by the evidentiary rules of the forum, (cite) and not by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
246. People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 950-51, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 171-72 (1990) (In 
Kelly, the court held that the defendant, in asking "How do I proceed?", was seeking 
clarification as to how to waive his rights, and was not expressing confusion about the 
nature of his rights. The court concluded that defendant's waiver was knowing, intelli-
gent, and uncoerced. Evidence showed that defendant's I.Qo was in the low-normal to 
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The court stated "the litmus test of a valid waiver or confession 
is voluntariness."247 The Court cited Moran as its authority for 
its voluntariness litmus test: "The relinquishment of the right 
must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of 
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or 
deception. "248 Yet there is no reference to the second, equally 
important Moran requirement - that "the waiver must have 
been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right 
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to aban-
don it."249 Moran states that the "totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation"2C10 must reveal "both an un-
coerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension" for the 
waiver to have been effective.2CIl Although the Kelly court dis-
cusses the waiver only in terms of its voluntariness, the court 
refers to both Moran requirements - that the totality of the cir-
cumstances determines whether the defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived Miranda rights. 2C12 Thus, it appears that the 
California Supreme Court does not consider the knowing and in-
telligent requirement as having vitality separate from the volun-
tariness analysis. The court ends its analysis with the voluntari-
ness test prescribed in Connelly. Thus, under Kelly, a waiver by 
a learning disabled juvenile could only be invalidated if held to 
be involuntary due to insufficient cognitive abilities, as discussed 
above in section (A) of the analysis. The court would not engage 
in any analysis of whether the waiver was knowing or intelligent 
unless there was evidence of coercion. 
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. 
Bernasco,21l3 stated that a valid Miranda waiver must be know-
ing and intelligent in addition to being voluntary. 2M The 
borderline range, CAT-scans revealed atrophy of brain tissue, and had learning disabili-
ties and attention-deficit disorder. None of this evidence was presented at the suppres-
sion hearing. The court stated that "standing alone such evidence does not establish that 
the waiver was involuntary absent coercion." [d. at 951, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 172). 
247. [d. at 950, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 171. 
248. [d. (citing Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986)). 
249. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (1986). 
250. [d. (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 
441 U.S. at 374-75 (1979)). 
251. [d. (emphasis added). 
252. [d. (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 (1979)). 
253. People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 2052 (1991). 
254. Id. See also Nat'l L. J., Dec. 24, 1990, at 25, col. 4. 
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Bernasco court includes in its analysis the second Moran re-
quirement to its waiver analysis omitted by the California Su-
preme Court in Kelly - "The waiver must have been made with 
a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned 
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it."21!1! The 
court embarks on an extensive judicial analysis of the conflicting 
signals regarding the knowing and intelligent requirement con-
tained in Connelly and the United States Supreme Court waiver 
decisions thereafter.2C!6 The court's analysis helps explain why 
Connelly strongly implies that the only appropriate place for the 
knowing and intelligent requirement is in terms of state eviden-
tiary rules,m yet post-Connelly United States Supreme Court 
cases deciding the waiver issue continue to speak in terms of 
"knowing and intelligent" waiver. 2M 
The Bernasco court stated that "Connelly merely means 
that, in general, issues of intelligent knowledge are separate is-
sues from issues of voluntariness."21!9 The court noted that Con-
nelly did not overrule Moran's requirement that a Miranda 
waiver be knowing and intelligent as well as voluntary. The 
Bernasco court reasoned that Connelly merely analyzed the con-
stitutional voluntariness component of a confession's admissibil-
ity and of a waiver's validity.260 The Bernasco court concluded 
that where a confession is given in situations not requiring Mi-
randa warnings (as in the first confession in Connelly), only vol-
untariness, rather than intelligent knowledge need be shown to 
satisfy the federal constitution. Yet where a defendant confesses 
after being given Miranda warnings (as in the subsequent con-
fessions in Connelly), both intelligent knowledge and voluntari-
ness remain as separate requirements.261 
In Bernasco, the juvenile accused had many traits in com-
255. Id. at 782 (citing Moran, 475 U.S. at 420 (1986». 
256. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 
(1988); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987). 
257. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986) (Voluntariness inquiries into a defendant's 
state of mind separate from any police coercion should be resolved by state evidentiary 
rules pertaining to reliability; such matters are not governed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause). 
258. See, e.g., infra notes 69-75, 244 and accompanying text. 
259. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2052 
(1991) (page numbers were not yet available when this article was published.). 
260. Id. (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 170 (1986». 
261. Id. 
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mon with a learning disabled juvenile. He had an I.Q. of 80, and 
was reading and comprehending at the fourth grade leveL A psy-
chologist testified at trial that the juvenile did not have the abil-
ity to understand the legal terms contained in the Miranda 
waiver form he signed.262 The trial court noted he had substan-
tial difficulty in understanding routine questions and was unable 
to understand simple concepts while testifying.263 The Court up-
held the trial court's determination that the juvenile's lack of 
cognitive abilities precluded knowing and intelligent waiver.264 
C. THE Connelly ADULT COERCION STANDARD DOES NOT ApPLY 
TO JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS 
As discussed above, the Connelly majority finds it inappro-
priate for the Supreme Court to make "sweeping inquiries into 
the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed" 
unless the police use coercion in obtaining the confession.26Ii Yet 
the Connelly Court considered the voluntariness of a waiver by 
262. People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 2052 (1991); People v. Bernasco, 185 Ill. App. 3d 480, 541 N.E.2d 774, 776 (1989). 
263. People v. Bernasco, 185 Ill. App. 3d 480, 541 N.E.2d 774, 776 (1989). 
264. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2052 
(1991). 
If intelligent knowledge in the Miranda sense means anything, 
it means the ability to understand the very words used in the 
warnings ... To waive rights knowingly and intelligently, one 
must at least understand basically what those rights encom-
pass and minimally what their waiver will entail. Here, de-
fendant was found not to understand fundamental terms con-
tained in the Miranda warnings of his rights, not to have been 
able to form an intent to waive those rights, and not to have a 
normal ability to understand questions and concepts. Such 
findings, if borne out by the evidence, are sufficient to warrant 
the conclusion that defendant did not waive his Miranda 
rights knowingly and intelligently and hence to justify sup-
pressing his confession. 
The court cited as additional authority: Note, Constitutional Protection of Confessions 
Made by Mentally Retarded Defendants, 14 AM. J.L. MED. 431, 432-33, 440-44 (1989); 
Holtz, Miranda in a Juvenile Setting: A Child's Right to Silence, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 534, 536-37, 546-56 (1987); Note, Now My Son, You Are a Man: The Judicial 
Response to Uncounseled Waivers of Miranda Rights by Juveniles in Pennsylvania, 92 
DICK. L. REV. 153, 168-171, 175-84 (1987); Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda 
Waivers, Confession Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 
U. PITT. L. REV. 1007, 1018-19, 1042-54 (1988); Note, Colorado v. Connelly: The Demise 
of Free Will as an Independent Basis for Finding a Confession Involuntary, 33 VILL. L. 
REV. 895, 907, 920-22 (1988». 
265. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67 (1986) (emphasis added). 
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an adult, not a juvenile. 
It is unclear whether the holding abrogates the heightened 
scrutiny traditionally afforded juvenile waiver inquiries by 
courts prior to Connelly.266 If the traditional protection afforded 
juveniles under federal case law is unchanged by Connelly, then 
waiver by juvenile offenders may be involuntary even absent po-
lice coercion. If the Connelly holding does not control juvenile 
waiver determinations, then subsequently, California courts 
would be free to follow MacPherson267 and consider a learning 
disability as a factor in determining the voluntariness of a juve-
nile waiver.268 
Juvenile courts in California have not expressly commented 
on whether the Connelly holding governs juvenile proceed-
ings.269 Yet juvenile courts may look toward criminal courts for 
guidance on this issue. Criminal courts have narrowly followed 
Connelly on the waiver issue. Yet both federal and California 
courts have consistently applied heightened scrutiny when ana-
lyzing juvenile waivers.270 No court has yet held that Connelly 
abrogates this heightened scrutiny. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Learning disabled juveniles are likely to lack sufficient cog-
nitive abilities to effectively waive Miranda rights. Their lack of 
cognitive abilities can preclude either voluntary or knowing and 
intelligent waiver. The heightened protection afforded juvenile 
waivers provides additional strength to the argument that in the 
totality of the circumstances, a learning disability is a significant 
factor in determining the validity of juvenile waivers. 
266. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 
P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1967); In re Anthony J., 107 Cal. App. 3d 962, 166 Cal. Rptr. 
238 (1980); See also infra note 14. 
267. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109, 465 P.2d 17,84 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970). 
268. People v. Sultana, 204 Cal. App. 3d 511 n.5, 251 Cal. Rptr. 115 n.5 (1988) ("It 
appears that under California Constitutional standards coercive police activity is not a 
necessary predicate to finding that a confession was involuntary." Id. (emphasis added) 
(citing, e.g., People v, MacPherson 2 Cal. 3d 109, 115, 465 P.2d 17, 21, 84 Cal. Rptr. 129, 
133 (1970»). 
269. See infra notes 210-11. 
270. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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The Connelly decision is a significant departure from the 
original protections afforded an accused by the Miranda Court. 
California voters have used the ballot proposition process to fur-
ther restrict criminal defendants' rights under the state consti-
tution. Yet some courts are beginning to recognize the relation-
ship between learning disabilities and juvenile Miranda waivers. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois in the Bernasco decision is an 
excellent example of judicial recognition of this relationship and 
of harmonizing it with the Connelly coercion requirement. If the 
Bernasco interpretation of Connelly remains unchallenged by 
the United States Supreme Court, other courts may perceive an 
avenue toward arriving at similar interpretations. 
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